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Abstract
Many philosophers have challenged the ideal of value-free science on the grounds that
social or moral values are relevant to inferential thresholds. But given this view, how
precisely and to what extent should scientists adjust their inferential thresholds in light
of non-epistemic values? We suggest that Signal Detection Theory (SDT) provides a
useful framework for addressing this question. Moreover, this approach opens up further
avenues for philosophical inquiry and has important implications for philosophical debates
concerning inductive risk. For example, the SDT framework entails that considerations of
inductive risk and inferential-threshold placement cannot be conducted in isolation from
base-rate information.
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1 Introduction
Inferential thresholds specify what evidence should be taken as sufficient for accepting,
asserting, or acting upon a claim in a context. An inferential threshold might be a level of
statistical significance, such as 0.05, or that a certain concentration of antibodies in a blood
sample should be taken to indicate that a person is HIV positive. Literature on inductive
risk has discussed the role of values of a social or ethical character in decisions about
where inferential thresholds should be placed, with particular attention being given to the
implications of this issue for the ideal of value-free science.1 However, this philosophical
debate has been mostly carried out in an informal manner. Those who argue that non-
epistemic values are relevant to scientific decisions about evidential thresholds have given
little attention to formal models capable of providing guidance on how precisely this ought
to be done.
To appreciate the significance of this lacuna, suppose that one were convinced of the
philosophical proposition that non-epistemic values should influence choices of inferential
thresholds in science and wanted to know how to apply it in practice. Then several
pressing questions immediately arise that cannot be addressed by informal discussions of
inductive risk and challenges it poses to the traditional ideal of value-free science. We
organize these into the following three groups: 1. Prospective: Where precisely should
an inferential threshold be placed in a given context and why? 2. Reverse Engineering:
What values are embedded in a given inferential threshold in a specific context? To
what extent can those values be “reverse engineered” from the choice of threshold and
details of the context, and how? 3. Conceptual Clarification: Can any of the ongoing
disputes surrounding inferential thresholds be partially or wholly resolved by substituting
a formal model for the prevailing informal modes of reasoning? Furthermore, are there
any aspects of the received view, as reached through informal reasoning, that are due
1See Churchman (1948), Rudner (1953), Jeffrey (1956), Levi (1962), Hempel (1965),
Douglas (2000, 2009), Wilholt (2009), Steel (2010), and Betz (2013).
some reconsideration in the light of the greater generality of a formal model? This paper
draws on concepts from Signal Detection Theory (SDT) to address these questions, and
illustrates this approach with several examples.
As explained in section 3, SDT provides a formal model in which questions about
optimal choices of inferential thresholds can be answered for classification and hypothesis-
testing problems. Therefore, it can provide answers to the three questions above. Given
inputs about probabilities and costs, it can provide a rationale for deciding where to set an
evidential threshold in a given context. Similarly, SDT can identify a range of assumptions
about probabilities and costs that would lead to a given choice of threshold, which entails
constraints on implicit valuations of costs if probabilities are known. Finally, the SDT
framework can clarify concepts and identify omissions that may occur in reasoning about
inferential thresholds, including some which have been discussed in literature on inductive
risk and others which have not.
The main body of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review
philosophical literature on inductive risk, with an eye toward exposing gaps that arise as
a result of the absence of a formal model. Section 3 presents the basic concepts of SDT
and illustrates them with a schematic example of a diagnostic test. The subsequent three
sections examine the three issues highlighted above. Section 4 discusses examples involv-
ing tuberculosis and lead poisoning to illustrate how evidential thresholds are determied
within SDT, taking the misclassification costs estimated in the medical literature as given.
In section 5, we examine the well-known 0.05 level of significance from the persepective
of reverse engineering values inherent in this inferential threshold. The potential for con-
ceptual clarification is explored in section 6, and is illustrated by base-rate neglect in the
context of inductive risk. Finally, section 7 concludes with a discussion of the relevance of
this framework for debates about inductive risk in the philosophy of science literature.
Before proceeding, we wish to emphasize two issues that we do not discuss here. First,
we do not attempt to justify or defend the claim that non-epistemic values should influence
scientists’ choice of inferential thresholds.2 Instead, our starting point is that if one accepts
this claim – as many philosophers of science do – then a formal framework such as SDT is
useful for mapping between values and inferential thresholds. Second, we do not attempt
to answer questions about which non-epistemic values should be reflected in assessments
of costs or how costs should be quantified. Although we give examples in which such
quantification has been carried out, we do not inquire here into the propriety of how this
was done.
2 The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR)
The classic presentation of AIR is found in Rudner’s (1953) accessible and compelling
analysis. More recently, AIR has enjoyed a resurgence, in no small measure due to Heather
Douglas’ (2000, 2009) influential work. Rudner’s formulation of the argument begins with
the premise that accepting and rejecting hypotheses is part of the daily work of scientists.
Yet, the argument proceeds, scientific inferences from evidence to hypotheses are always
more or less uncertain. Consequently, accepting a hypothesis requires a value judgment
about how much uncertainty is tolerable in the situation. That value judgment, moreover,
is often ethical in nature, since it depends on how bad, from a moral perspective, it would
be to err in one direction or another. In Rudner’s example, a higher inferential threshold
would be required to accept that a toxic ingredient in a drug is not present at lethal
levels than to accept that a batch of belt buckles stamped by a machine are not defective.
Thus, according to Rudner, “How sure we need to be before we accept a hypothesis will
depend on how serious a mistake would be” (Rudner, 1953, 2). And value judgments
about the seriousness of mistakes will reflect the “moral standards” of those who make
them (Rudner, 1953, 2). Rudner took the above reasoning to show that “the scientist as
2An anonymous referee points out that a number of epistemologists have recently ar-
gued that numerical loss functions can encode purely epistemic concerns (Joyce, 1998;
Pettigrew, 2016).
scientist does make value judgments” (Rudner, 1953, 2).
Douglas (2000, 2009) modifies and extends AIR in several respects. For example, rather
than acceptance, Douglas speaks of asserting scientific claims, and rather than concluding
that scientists actually do make value judgments, Douglas insists that they have a moral
responsibility to do so (2009). In addition, Douglas (2000) extends AIR to encompass de-
cisions involved in generating evidence, including coding individual data points (e.g., as a
malignant tumor or not) as well as selecting assumptions (e.g., threshold versus linear dose
response) that underlie statistical models used in data analysis.3 However, despite these
differences a recognizable pattern is evident. In general, variants of AIR insist, first, that
inferences must be made from stochastic or otherwise uncertain evidence to one of a small
number of discrete options, such as accept/reject/suspend judgment or assert/deny/refrain
from commenting (see Steele, 2012). And second, it is claimed that value judgments of
an ethical or moral nature are relevant to deciding how to make such inferences. Classic
objections to AIR challenge one of these two steps. For example, Jeffrey (1956) challenges
the first by asserting that scientists should not accept or reject hypotheses, and should
instead limit themselves to reporting the probabilities of hypotheses given available evi-
dence. In contrast, Levi (1960, 1962) agrees that accepting and rejecting hypotheses is
a proper part of science, but argues that in a scientific context these decisions should be
driven exclusively by scientific values, such as explanatory scope and simplicity. A more
recent criticism of AIR due to Betz (2013) can also be construed as targeting the second
of the two steps just highlighted. That is, Betz claims that, if qualifications regarding
uncertainty are thoroughly incorporated into the claims in question, then it is possible to
avoid value judgments about how much certainty is enough.
In this paper, our purpose is to explore implications of a formalization of AIR, with a
focus on accepting or asserting hypotheses in light of statistical data. Consequently, we
3Some argue against expanding the scope of AIR in this manner (see Biddle and Kukla,
2016).
focus on aspects of the inductive risk literature that are relevant to the three questions
highlighted above under the labels prospective, reverse engineering, and conceptual clari-
fication. Since these questions all presume that one version or another of AIR is correct,
we will not further review objections to the soundness of that argument here. Instead, we
consider the somewhat less extensive subset of the inductive risk literature that is relevant
to these three questions.
Let us begin with the prospective category, that is, questions about where to set an
inferential threshold in a given context. As noted above, advocates of AIR propose no
formal normative model of how probabilities and values should lead to decisions about
inferential thresholds. Wald (1942) set out a general, abstract framework for determining
the “best” Statistical Decision Function (SDF) and its associated critical region, which
Churchman (1948) discusses in some detail. Although the post-Churchman AIR litera-
ture continues to acknowledge Wald, it has not, to our knowledge, developed any formal
model of how probabilities and non-epistemic values should jointly determine inferential
thresholds. As a result, it is unclear which inferential threshold should be chosen given
background knowledge and values – even for one who wishes to follow the argument from
inductive risk. Scarantino (2010), presenting an “illustration of one of the legitimate roles
non-epistemic values can play in science” (p. 422), argues that “...the degree of confirma-
tion required for accepting the HLA [Human Leucocyte Antigen] Hypothesis should be
very high...” (p. 429). But how high, exactly?
Turn then to the second type of question: reverse engineering. It is sometimes claimed
that influences of values are inherent or inevitable in choices of inferential thresholds
(Wilholt, 2009; Steele, 2012; Winsberg, 2012). However, several other philosophers have
noted that inferential thresholds may be chosen for reasons unrelated to ethical or social
values, such as convenience or inertia, and consequently that the motivations of a choice
cannot be inferred from its ethically or socially significant impacts (Parker, 2010; Morrison,
2014; Steel, 2016). In what sense, then, can values be said to be implicit in a choice
of inferential threshold? And how can one infer such implicit values from inferential
thresholds plus constraints of the case? Can specific instances of scientific inference be
‘reverse engineered’ to reveal the values implicit in the standard of evidence utilized?
We are not aware of any work in the inductive risk literature that provides a means for
answering such questions.
Our final question type is conceptual clarification. The absence of a formal model
can leave some important aspects of reasoning about inductive risk unclear. For example,
Douglas (2009) argues that scientists have a moral obligation to consider harms that might
result if claims they make are mistaken, but she does not similarly argue that they have
an obligation to consider benefits that accrue if their claims are correct. This has led some
to ask whether there is any reason to limit attention to harms of error in decisions about
inferential thresholds, or whether the benefits of getting it right should also be considered
(Elliott, 2011; Wilholt, 2016). As we explain below, the SDT framework provides a simple
and compelling answer to this question. In addition, discussions of inductive risk are
typically framed in terms of probabilities of false negatives and false positives – that is,
the chance of rejecting a claim when when it is true or of accepting it when it is false.
Such discussions make it easy to overlook the role of base rates in assessments of inductive
risk, and indeed this role has received very little, if any attention in the philosophical AIR
literature. Nevertheless, base rates play an essential role in decisions about inferential
thresholds in the SDT framework we describe.
3 Signal Detection Theory and Inductive Risk
In this section, we present the essential features of SDT and explain how it can be applied to
inductive-risk problems. SDT is not the only formal framework within which the determi-
nation of inferential thresholds may be studied. For instance Bayesian decision theory can
be employed to solve for the action that maximizes subjective expected utility, where the
‘action’ in question is adopting an inferential threshold (Berger, 1985). Similarly, it would
also be possible to follow an explicitly Bayesian reconstruction of reverse-engineering-mode
SDT (see Kadane et al., 1999). Nevertheless we elect to work within SDT – which can
be viewed as a special case of Bayesian decision theory4 – rather than full-blown Bayesian
decision theory because SDT is a simplified, practitioner-friendly framework that is spe-
cialized for the very purpose of determining optimal inferential thresholds and which has
been actively used for this purpose within the scientific community throughout the post-
WWII period.
Preliminaries SDT is a tractable and generic framework within which to analyze simple
classification and hypothesis-testing problems. Examples of SDT may be found in diverse
areas ranging from meteorology to medical diagnostics, as well as in quality control, credit
scoring, and fraud detection in industry.5 For concreteness, we will introduce and illustrate
the concepts of SDT in the context of simple two-state medical diagnosis, in which the
two health-state categories are ‘healthy’ (¬D) and ‘disease present’ (D). In the generic
language of hypothesis testing, these correspond to the null hypothesis and the alternative
hypothesis, respectively.
The diagnostic problem consists of inferring the patient’s disease state {¬D,D} through
observing the value of a score variable X ∈ R. SDT provides a method for determining
an optimal cutoff threshold x∗ ∈ R above which it is inferred that the patient’s health
state is D, and the patient is said to test ‘positive’ for the disease. It is important for
SDT that the score variable be real valued, as this is necessary for the construction of the
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, which we discuss below.
Some diagnostic tests are very simple, in that a patient’s score-variable value is obtained
from a single direct measurement – for instance from measurement of the blood-sample
concentration of a specific enzyme. In many diagnostic tests, however, the score-variable
value is obtained by combining the results from several different direct measurements (of
4We thank an anonymous referee for flagging these overlaps between SDT and Bayesian
decision theory.
5See e.g. Swets (2001) and Swets et al. (2000) for a sample of diverse applications.
biomarkers) through a specifically developed (and validated) formula.
Sampling distributions Using the best available method – in some cases implemented
through posthumous dissection – the true disease-D health state is determined for each
subject in an N -strong representative sample of the population. This establishes the base-
rate prevalence of the disease pD = nD/N . The information also allows the construction
of two sampling distributions, which we represent as the conditional distribution of score-
variable values among the healthy f(x|¬D) and among those with the disease f(x|D).
Among the healthy there is variation in the score-variable values, and thus the empirical
distribution has positive variance σˆ2¬D > 0, which is a measure of the noise present in the
score variable. Similarly, there is variation in the score-variable values among those with
the disease σˆ2D > 0. If there were no overlap between the densities f(x|¬D) and f(x|D),
diagnosis would be trivial and in principle, error free. The fact that the densities f(x|¬D)
and f(x|D) do overlap, almost invariably, sets the stage for explicitly striking a tradeoff
between errors of the first and second kind.
In practical diagnostic problems, SDT is applied directly to empirical sampling dis-
tributions. But for the purposes of developing the formal machinery of SDT, it is useful
to work with families of known probability distributions. In this presentation we will use
Gaussian sampling distributions, although in the literature one also finds applications of
the Chi-square, Poisson, Gamma, power-law (exponential), geometric (Egan, 1975), lo-
gistic, extreme-value (DeCarlo, 1998), triangular, and beta (Marzban, 2004) families of
distributions.
Under the Gaussian assumption, we may specify the sampling distribution among the
healthy as X¬D ∼ N(µ¬D, σ
2
¬D) and among those with the disease as XD ∼ N(µD, σ
2
D).
Crucially, diagnosis by applying a cutoff threshold can perform better than chance when
µ¬D < µD.
6 Any given cutoff threshold x′ simultaneously defines the True-Negative Rate
6The opposite case µ¬D > µD is not analyzed here, as it may be converted into the
case we consider through a simple transformation.
(TNRx′ = 1−αx′) and the False-Positive Rate (FPRx′ = αx′ i.e. Type-I error rate) as well
as the True-Positive Rate (TPRx′ = 1− βx′ i.e. statistical power) and the False-Negative
Rate (FNRx′ = βx′ i.e. Type-II error rate).




















Figure 1: The TPR1 = 1 − β1 = 0.84 (in gray) and the FPR1 = α1 = 0.16 (in red)
generated by the cutoff threshold x′ = 1 when X¬D ∼ N(0, 1) and XD ∼ N(2, 1).
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Receiver Operating Characteristics curve The extent to which diagnosis by us-
ing the cutoff threshold x′ performs better than mere chance – i.e. in comparison with
diagnosis by flipping a coin – depends on the extent to which the True-Positive Rate
(TPRx′ = 1 − βx′) exceeds the False-Positive Rate (FPRx′ = αx′). This of course varies
parametrically with the cutoff threshold x′.
The Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve is the name given to this para-
metric plot of the locus of (αx′ , 1−βx′) pairs generated by allowing x
′ to vary from −∞ to
∞ (see Figure 2b). In so doing, the ROC curve encodes the highest-attainable statistical
power 1−β for any given fixed Type-I error rate α, holding constant the parameters of the
sampling distributions.7 In other words, the ROC curve encodes the best-attainable com-
binations of TPR and FPR. Furthermore, because of the analytical ROC curve’s smooth,
differentiable form,8 it is particularly useful in capturing the entire range of possible trade-
offs that may be struck between the TPR and the FPR.
7The ROC curve permits the Neyman-Pearson lemma to be implemented directly by
‘reading off’ the greatest-attainable statistical power associated with a fixed Type-I error
rate (such as α = 0.05).
8unlike typical empirical ROC curves
Figure 2: ROC curve for sampling distributions X¬D ∼ N(0, 1) and XD ∼ N(2, 1).
(a) x′ = −0.5, FPR−.5 = 0.69
(in red), TPR−.5 = 0.99 (in
gray). See green marker.
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(b) ROC curve. Markers indicate the
(FPR,TPR) pairs associated with x′=2.5


















(c) x′ = 2.5, FPR2.5 = 0.01 (in
red), TPR2.5 = 0.31 (in gray).
See blue marker.
−4 −2 0 2 x ′ 4 6
The ROC curve is a routinely and widely used general performance measure for evalu-
ating classifiers and diagnostic tests. The Area Under the Curve (AUC) of an ROC curve
is a summary measure of performance. ROC curves of uninformative diagnostic tests coin-
cide with the FPR=TPR diagonal, and are characterized by AUC= 0.5 and performance
no better than diagnosis by coin toss – regardless of the cutoff threshold. The ROC curve
of a perfect classifier – assuming one could be found – would rise to the top left-hand
corner where (FPR,TPR)=(1,1), whereby AUC=1. Diagnostic tests may be ranked by
their AUCs, which in general fall within the open interval (0.5,1).
As the ROC curve is a visualization of sampling-distribution integrals (see equations
(3.1b) (3.2b)), the AUC depends on the relationship between the sampling distributions.
In our example of unit-equal-variance Gaussian sampling distributions, the AUC is de-
termined uniquely by the normalized distance between the sampling distributions, which
is called the discriminability of the diagnostic test d′ = (µD − µ¬D)/σ. Let Φ(·) denote
the standard-normal Cumulative Distribution Function. The AUC in this example has a
particularly simple representation: AUC=Φ( d
′√
2
). Thus in Figure 2b, AUC=Φ( 2√
2
) = 0.92,
which is a fairly high value, given that the AUC may, under certain assumptions, be inter-
preted as the probability that a randomly selected positive case i will have a score value
that is larger than a randomly selected negative case j (Green and Swets, 1966).9
(Mis-)classification costs In SDT, value judgments relating to outcomes are framed as
costs, which in applications are generally expressed in (ratio-scale) monetary units.10 But
9i.e. in the Figure 2b example P (xi > xj) = 0.92
10The monetary-equivalent values of non-market-traded amenities – such as Quality-
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) – may be incorporated into the misclassification-cost ma-
trix using e.g. Contingent-Valuation methods, but this requires a separate, resource-
intensive, methodologically challenging extra-statistical investigation of its own (Bobinac
et al., 2014).
ultimately, it is the user of SDT who determines the units in which costs are denominated,
as well as the types of factors that are deemed to be relevant in the diagnostic problem.11
There clearly are technical, ethical, institutional and sometimes legal questions to be
confronted in determining the nature of the assay undertaken and the factors taken into
consideration when computing each of the misclassification-cost-matrix elements. These
considerations receive very little attention in the SDT literature, as determination of the
numerical values with which to populate the misclassification-cost matrix is considered to
be an extra-statistical, domain- and context-specific matter.
The misclassification-cost matrix comprises four elements, one for each State×Inference
combination. Each row in Table 1 represents a state of nature. The top row pertains to
the disease-present state (D). In this state, the patient’s score value is drawn from f(x|D)
and the diagnostic test delivers a True-Positive result with associated cost CTP when
x′ < x, else a False-Negative result with associated cost CFN. The bottom row pertains
to the disease-absent state (¬D). In this state, the patient’s score value is drawn from
f(x|¬D) and the diagnostic test delivers a False-Positive result with associated cost CFP
when x′ < x, else a True-Negative result with associated cost CTN.






Consider the misclassification-cost matrix in connection with an example involving
a diagnostic test, where an effective treatment for the disease in question exists and is
available to those tested. It is customary to set CTN = 0. Under these circumstances,
11Hagen (1995) for instance calculates misclassification costs in terms of changes to the
mortality rate, excluding “outcomes such as inconvenience, pain, or monetary cost (p.
230).”
CFN > CTP > 0. That is, it is best not to have the disease at all, but if you have it, it is
better to be correctly diagnosed and treated than not to be diagnosed. The costs in the
bottom row in Table 1 are those of not having the disease when the test result is positive
or negative, respectively. In this case, CFP > CTN, since the false-positive test leads to
harmful effects (e.g., anxiety, unnecessary medical procedures, etc.). Figure 3 provides a
numerical example of what a classification matrix might look like in a medical diagnostic
example such as this.
Note that the relationships among the misclassification costs will not always be as in
Figure 3. For example, false negatives are not always worse than false positives (i.e., it
is not always the case tht CFN > CFP). But we will assume in general that CFP > CTN
and similarly CFN > CTP. This assumption entails in effect that learning the truth about
the hypothesis is better than coming to a false conclusion about it. Yet it is conceivable
that this might not be the case and, for instance, that CTP could exceed CFN. This could
happen in instances of harmful knowledge, such as Kitcher’s example of, “the imaginary
discovery that vast quantities of energy could be released by mixing readily obtainable
ingredients in just the right proportions, a discovery whose widespread publication would
make our world an extraordinarily risky place” (Kitcher, 2001, 149). In this example,
falsely concluding that homemade weapons of mass destruction are not possible is better
(less costly) than correctly discovering how to make them. However, in such an example
the obvious implication is that the inquiry should not proceed, in which case questions
about appropriate inference thresholds would be moot.
Loss function In principle, the optimal cutoff threshold x∗ could be determined by opti-
mizing any one of a large number of different potential ‘loss functions’.12 With few notable
12In different fields, the losss function is also known as, inter alia, a ‘goal function’, a
‘reward function’, an ‘objective function’, or a ‘penalty function’.
exceptions,13 the loss function overwhelmingly employed in SDT is expected misclassifica-
tion cost.14 The mathematical expectation is taken with respect to the misclassification
costs, where the probability weights are compounds between base-rate prevalences pD,
p¬D and the conditional, x
′-dependent probabilities 1 − αx′ , αx′ , βx′ , and 1 − βx′ . It is
customary to incorporate also the fixed cost of implementing the diagnostic test, C0. For
concreteness, we present the expected-misclassification-cost expression E(C) here in full:
E(C) = CTPP (TP) + CFNP (FN) + CTNP (TN) + CFPP (FP) + C0
= −[CFN − CTP] · pD · (1− βx′) + [CFP − CTN] · p¬D · αx′
+ CTN · p¬D + CFN · pD + C0 . (3.3)
Optimality condition The optimal cutoff threshold x∗ is obtained as the solution to
the constrained minimization problem in which expected misclassification cost (3.3) is
minimized subject to the constraint on (αx′ , 1−βx′) given by the ROC curve.
The slope of each iso-expected-cost contour15 – and therefore also the slope of the
cost-minimising iso-expected-cost line at the optimal operating point on the ROC curve –
13See Ulehla (1966) and Levi (1985) for non-risk-neutral expected utility, or, with ad-
ditional restrictions, Kaivanto (2014) for Cumulative Prospect Theory.
14In a Bayesian setting one minimizes the risk function, which is the expected value of
the loss function. Here we collapse terminology in the interest of simplicity, and refer to
the expected value of the misclassification costs as ‘the loss function’.
15The loss function (3.3) defines a plane in the third dimension above the unit-square
ROC space. This plane is canted down toward the top-left corner (0,1). A contour of this
plane – i.e. the set of all points in the plane that are at the same expected-cost ‘elevation’
C¯ – may be represented as a straight line within the two-dimensional ROC space. As all
(α, 1−β) points in this line are associated with the same expected misclassification cost
C¯, it is called an iso-expected-cost contour or an iso-expected-cost line.
is the ratio of expected incremental cost of misclassifying a healthy subject (¬D) to the
expected incremental cost of misclassifying a diseased subject (D).














Recall that 1 − β = TPR is represented on the vertical axis of the ROC space, while
α = FPR is represented on the horizontal axis of the ROC space.16 The term on the
right-hand side of (3.4) is the slope of the tangent to the ROC curve at the expected-cost-
minimizing point (C¯∗). The term on the left-hand side is the above-mentioned ratio of
expected incremental cost of misclassifying a healthy subject to the expected incremental
cost of misclassifying a diseased subject. Since all of the terms on the left-hand side
are known, we also know the slope of the tangent to the ROC curve at the expected-cost-
minimizing point. The point along the ROC curve where equality (3.4) holds17 determines
the optimal test size and power (α∗, 1−β∗), and simultaneously, the optimal inferential
threshold in the score variable x∗. Hence the former may also be written as (αx∗ , 1−βx∗).
In Figure 3 we present a simple numerical illustration of how the Optimal Operat-
ing Point Condition (3.4) is implemented. The left-hand side presents (I) the base-rate
probabilities, (II) the misclassification costs, and (III) the calculated slope of the iso-
expected-cost line. On the right-hand side Subfigure 3b presents the tangency condition
graphically within the ROC space, which identifies the optimal test size and statistical
power as (α∗, 1−β∗) = (0.116, 0.423). It may be helpful to consider what sort of situa-







denotes the derivative of x with respect to y at the point where
z = z¯ holds.
17which corresponds to a tangency condition between the cost-minimizing iso-expected-
cost line and the ROC curve
the disease is one that has very severe effects if left untreated. Moreover, note that in
the example CFP is almost equal to CTP. In other words, being incorrectly diagnosed as
having the disease is almost as bad as being diagnosed and actually having it. Such an
assessment of costs would be sensible in a case in which diagnosis leads directly to treat-
ment, for instance, without further, more accurate, diagnostic tests and the treatment is
very effective.
Figure 3: Illustration with sampling distributions X¬D ∼ N(0, 1) and XD ∼ N(1, 1).
(a) Parameters.















(IV) α∗ = 0.116 , 1− β∗ = 0.423
(b) ROC curve with tangency condition.
 
 














The larger the ratio in condition (3.4), (i) the farther to the left the optimal operating
point occurs on the ROC curve, (ii) the smaller the optimal test size α∗ and power 1−β∗,
and (iii) the larger the cutoff-threshold score x∗. These properties (i)–(iii) are general and
independent of the specific parametric form of the sampling distributions. In connection
with our disease example, this means that if the disease is very rare and if a mistaken
positive diagnosis is more harmful than a mistaken negative diagnosis, then a very strict
evidential threshold should be required for accepting that the disease is present (i.e., for
rejecting the null hypothesis ¬D). Conversely, a less strict threshold would be appropriate
if the disease is common or if mistakenly thinking the disease absent is much worse than
mistakenly thinking it is present. Our numerical example illustrates the latter situation.
That is, it is an example in which false negatives are much worse than false positives,
which is reflected in the optimal test size being larger than the conventional 0.05. The
optimal test size would be larger still but for the low prevalence rate of pD = 0.1. Note
that the difference between CFN and CTP is important for determining how harmful it is,
in expectation, to mistakenly conclude the disease is absent. For instance, if there is no
effective treatment for the disease, then little may be lost by not diagnosing it. In such
a case, CTP would be close to CFN, and consequently the denominator of (3.4) would be
small even if CFN were very high.
In the medical SDT literature, the square-bracketed term in condition (3.4) is com-
monly referred to as the Cost-Benefit (C/B) ratio. Since negative costs are benefits just as
negative benefits are costs – remember that SDT requires costs to be ratio-scale measures
– the medical SDT literature uses the following equivalent form of the square-bracketed
















In what follows, we discuss how the SDT framework can usefully address the three
questions we highlighted in the introduction under the labels prospective, reverse engi-
neering, and conceptual clarification.
4 Prospective examples
Prospective questions have to do with exactly where to set an evidential threshold in a
specific context, given information about costs and probabilities. Although it is relatively
rare for scientists to use SDT for this purpose, some applications exist. For example,
Cantor et al. (1999) performed a structured survey of the medical literature between 1976
and 1997 inclusive. Their search identified 48 articles explicitly mentioning a C/B ratio or
an explicit method for determining the cutoff threshold. Altogether 14 articles included a
C/B ratio as part of the ROC analysis. In this section, we discuss two examples: tuber-
culosis and lead poisoning. In addition to illustrating how SDT can work in practice to
determine inferential thresholds, these two examples also illustrate philosophically signif-
icant themes about inductive risk that will be further elaborated in subsequent sections
of this article. The tuberculosis example illustrates the importance of base rates, while
the lead poisoning example illustrates misclassification-cost matrix operationalization and
the effect of improvements in scientific discriminability (d′ and AUC) on the inferential
threshold.
4.1 Tuberculosis
The 1/400=0.0025 C/B ratio reported by Lusted (1971) pertained to the US population
in 1971, and of course this would be different if one were to re-consider the costs specific
to particular sub-populations, whether they would be identified by demographic variables
or by geography. Lusted (1971) arrives at this C/B ratio by eliciting the physician’s at-
titudes concerning the relative value of true-positive vs. true-negative diagnoses, followed
by “questions about the relative cost of diagnostic errors compared with the value of cor-
rect diagnoses,” in each case disaggregating across numerous subjective-value categories18
and objective-value categories.19 Thus, Lusted’s (1971) misclassification costs reflect non-
epistemic values as this term is usually understood by philosophers (Douglas, 2009; Steel,
181. Value to my self-esteem of correct diagnosis; 2. Value to referring physiciancs of
correct diagnosis; 3. Value to my reputation with referring physicians; 4. Value to patient
of correct diagnosis; 5. Value to my reputation with patients; 6. Value to society of correct
diagnosis; 7. et cetera...
191. My professional fee; 2. et cetera...
2010). That is, the values in question are not focused on truth, explanatory power, or
other knowledge-seeking aims commonly associated with science, but instead concern the
human welfare and economic impacts of correct and incorrect diagnoses. Consequently,
while the sharpness of the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values may be
questioned, we take the tuberculosis example discussed in this section to illustrate AIR.
With a known C/B ratio, the slope of the iso-expected-cost line then depends on the
base-rate odds of the healthy relative to those with the disease p¬D
pD
. A prevalence of 0.0005
implies an iso-expected-cost line slope of 0.0025× 0.9995
0.0005
= 5.00. If, on the other hand, the
prevalence is 117.8
100,000
= 0.001178, as in Romania in 2006, then the slope of the threshold-
determining iso-expected-cost line is 0.0025× 0.9988
0.001178
= 2.12. The prevalence of 0.001178 is
of course an average that overstates the prevalence for most of the Romanian population,
as most cases of tuberculosis are concentrated within particular sub-populations. And if
the prevalence is 870
100,000
= 0.0087, as in Lusaka province of Zambia in 2009 (Ayles et al.,
2009), the slope of the iso-expected-cost line falls to 0.0025 × 0.9913
0.0087
= 0.28. Of course
these calculations presume that the C/B ratio applicable in Romania and Lusaka is the
same as that which applies in the USA – an assumption made here to retain comparability
between the optimality conditions as the base rate varies from one population to another.
The associated optimal operating points are illustrated in Figure 4, which assumes that
the diagnostic test has unit discriminability d′ = 1. The greater the iso-expected-cost
line’s slope, the smaller the α∗ and 1−β∗. The diagnostic test’s optimal operating point
is (0.0159, 0.1362) for the US population, (0.103, 0.4005) for the Romanian population,
and (0.78, 0.9637) for the Zambian population. The comparatively high prevalence of
tuberculosis in Zambia entails a liberal cutoff threshold, whereas the comparatively low
prevalence of tuberculosis in the US entails a more conservative cutoff threshold.
Figure 4: Illustration of optimal operating point determination for tuberculosis testing in
the US, Romania, and Zambia using sampling distributions X¬D ∼ N(0, 1) and XD ∼
N(1, 1) and C/B = 1/400.
(a) Parameters.
Country Base rate Slope α∗ 1−β∗
US 0.000500 5.00 0.0159 0.1362
Romania 0.001178 2.12 0.1030 0.4005
Zambia 0.008700 0.28 0.7800 0.9637
(b) ROC curve with tangency conditions.
 
 















Note that the square-bracketed cost term in condition (3.4) may not be reduced to a single
number without explicitly identifying each of the costs (CTN, CFP, CTP, CFN) separately.
DeBaun and Sox (1991) trace the direct medical costs and the indirect human-capital-
based costs associated with each (mis-)classication category of lead poisoning. As in the
tuberculosis example just discussed, these monetary-value-denominated costs unambigu-
ously reflect non-epistemic values. Table 2 shows that the indirect costs, especially those
associated with False-Negative diagnoses, far exceed the other categories of misclassifica-
tion cost.
Table 2: Misclassification costs (US$) associated with lead-poisoning diagnosis (DeBaun
and Sox, 1991, p. 128).
Direct Indirect Total
Costs Costs
CTP 1,463 2,898 4,361
CTN 63 0 63
CFP 168 0 168
CFN 63 6,096 6,159
Combined with the 12% nationwide prevalence of lead poisoning at the time (DeBaun
















= (7.3˙)[0.0584] = 0.428 . (4.1)
The optimal operating point depends not only on the slope of the iso-expected-cost line
(4.1), but also on the Area Under the Curve (AUC), which in turn is increasing in the
normalized distance between the sampling distributions d′. Figure 5 shows the relationship
between the optimal false-positive rate α∗ obtained with the iso-expected-cost line slope
(4.1) as the AUC increases from 0.5 to 1. For very low-discriminability AUCs where the
ROC curve virtually coincides with the principal diagonal, (4.1) entails that the optimal
cutoff threshold x∗ is far in the left tail, and therefore α∗ =
∫∞
x∗
f(x|¬D)dx ≈ 1. As
discriminability and the AUC increase, the optimal cutoff threshold x∗ moves to the right
out of the left tail and α∗ begins to fall. However given that the iso-expected-cost line’s
slope is very shallow (0.428), α∗ begins to approach the conventional α = 0.05 level only
when the AUC approaches 1.
Figure 5: Lead-poisoning test’s α∗ computed for all possible values of AUC ∈ [0.5, 1],
holding misclassification costs and the base rate constant.
 
 















In this section, we consider the relevance of SDT to the notion that social or ethical values
can be implicit in choices of inferential thresholds even when such values are not explicitly
invoked as reasons for the choice. We approach this question by considering the case of
the widespread convention of 0.05 as the cut-off for statistical significance. We suggest
that the notion of values implicit in a choice of inferential threshold be construed in a
rational-reconstruction sense rather than in a psychological sense. That is, implicit values
are those that, if accepted, would support a choice of inferential threshold, but which
are not necessarily the values that actually motivate practitioners to adopt it. Thus, we
consider what those values might be in the case of the α = 0.05 convention, bearing in
mind that according to SDT the answer to this question also depends on the base rate
and the area under the ROC curve.20
5.1 Embedded values in the α = 0.05 convention
Under Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST), many fields have adopted an inferential-
threshold convention that is applied as de facto requirement for publication. Specifically,
many fields have adopted α = 0.05 as their inferential-threshold convention, although some
fields have opted for stricter thresholds.21 Insofar as a scientific field is characterized by
the application of a particular collection of empirical methods to study a particular collec-
tion of questions and hypotheses, it may in some sense be reasonable to assume ‘roughly
similar’ misclassification costs and ‘roughly similar’ base rates. However the mathematical
structure of SDT reveals that rigid application of a particular evidential threshold pre-
supposes a precise non-linear relationship between misclassification costs and base rates –
which furthermore varies with discriminability (i.e. AUC).
















must be equal to the slope of















For our Gaussian sampling distributions, the slope of the tangent to the ROC curve
with d′ = 2.0 and AUC=0.92 at α = 0.05 is 3.63. Therefore only those combinations of
20Throughout this section we maintain the assumption that sampling distributions are
equal-variance Gaussian. Qualitatively similar results would be obtained with other sym-
metric, equal-variance sampling distributions.
21Particle physics employs a “5σ” (p < .0000003) threshold. This reflects standard
good statistical practice of adjusting the inferential-threshold downward whenever multiple










whose product is 3.63 are consistent – in the expected misclassification-
cost minimizing sense – with α = 0.05. The red curve in Figure 6 represents all such
combinations. Meanwhile, the slope of the tangent to the ROC curve with d′ = 0.2 and











whose product is equal to 1.36, and are therefore consistent with
α = 0.05 for d′ = 0.2 and AUC=0.56
When dicriminability is d′ = 2.0 and AUC=0.92, all hypotheses featuring base-rate
odds and incremental-misclassification-cost ratios that fall above the red curve receive
biased treatment in that the α = 0.05 inferential threshold is suboptimally liberal in the
sense of making it too easy to reject the null hypothesis. Conversely, all hypotheses whose
base-rate odds and incremental-misclassification-cost ratios fall below the red curve receive
biased treatment in that the α = 0.05 inferential threshold is suboptimally conservative in
the sense of making it too difficult to reject the null hypothesis.
Of course, given the costs and inherent epistemic difficulties involved in estimating
base-rate and incremental-misclassification-cost ratios, it would be unreasonable to de-
mand that every scientific hypothesis test be implemented with its own, individually op-
timized inferential threshold α∗. In addition to these general concerns, applying SDT
to scientific hypotheses raises special difficulties in assessing misclassification-cost ratios.
The practical applications of the hypothesis, if any, may be difficult for researchers to
anticipate, as may be its impact on science. Moreover, a hypothesis may be tested multi-
ple times, and misclassification costs might not be constant across the several tests. For
instance, one more experiment to test a hypothesis that has already been the subject of
extensive research may have less impact than a path-breaking study that tests a hypothe-
sis for the first time.22 Given such considerations, justifications of the α = 0.05 convention
– or indeed any other conventional cut-off – are best interpreted as attempts to show
22Note that the practice of fixed-level testing has been shown to be incoherent in the
Bayesian setting (see e.g. Schervish et al., 2002).
Figure 6: Schedules between base-rate odds and incremental misclassification-cost ratios

















that the cut-off is a good-enough approximation in a particular field (Wilholt, 2009). Let
us assume, then, that the choice of α = 0.05 in a scientific field should be justified in
this manner. Then we can ask what sorts of general assumptions about base rates and
misclassification costs are presumed by such reasoning.
The pattern revealed in Figure 6 is that α = 0.05 entails either that ICFP greatly
exceeds ICFN or p¬D greatly exceeds pD – but not both as this would entail an even lower
α. For example in the d′ = 2.0 and AUC=0.92 line, if the base-rate odds are 2, then the
incremental misclassification cost ratio must be slightly less than 2. If the base-rate odds
were 2 while the incremental misclassification cost ratio were, say, 5, then α = 0.05 would
be suboptimal insofar as permitting too many Type-I errors. And if the base-rate odds
are 10, then α = 0.05 entails that the incremental misclassification cost ratio is less than 1
(i.e., ICFN is greater than ICFP). Conversely, if the incremental misclassification cost ratio
is 10, then the base-rate odds are below 1 (i.e., pD > p¬D). We consider the implications
of this pattern by examining two types of case in which the α = 0.05 convention might be
challenged.
Begin with what one might call a Popperian outlook on science, according to which
the vast majority of hypotheses are false and priority should be placed on avoiding false
positives. In other words, under this assumption, p¬D far exceeds pD (e.g., by a factor
of at least 6 to 1) while ICFP is significantly greater than ICFN (e.g., at least two times
greater). In this case, inspection of Figure 6 suggests the α = 0.05 convention is too
lenient, and that a smaller value of α, and hence a stricter standard for rejecting null
hypotheses, would be called for. Adopting the α = 0.05 convention in such a context,
then, would be problematic, since it might contribute an unacceptable rate of errors or
failures of replication. To adopt the α = 0.05 convention in a scientific field, then, is to
implicitly assume that the situation just described does not obtain there. In other words,
it is to assume that either the base rate of true hypotheses is reasonably high or that
false positives are not much worse than false negatives. It is unclear to what extent such
assumptions are correct in areas of science in which the α = 0.05 convention is prevalent.
However, SDT shows that any attempt to justify the α = 0.05 convention must take such
matters into consideration.
Next consider a case in which false negatives are assumed to be far worse than false
positives, say, by a factor of 10. Some philosophers have argued that, in such cases,
the α = 0.05 convention is unjustified and that a higher value of α should be chosen
instead (Cranor, 1993; Shrader-Frechette, 1991). However, the above analysis shows that
such arguments are crucially incomplete. Even if ICFN exceeds ICFP by a factor of 10,
α = 0.05 or an even lower setting of α may still be justified if the hypotheses tested in the
field are overwhelmingly false.
We draw the following conclusions from the discussion in this section. First, the SDT
framework can be used to identify sets of assumptions about base rates and incremental
misclassification costs that, given the ROC curve associated with a test, could be used to
rationalize an antecedently made choice of α. In this sense, SDT can be said to provide
a basis for reverse engineering values that are inherent or implicit in choices of evidential
thresholds in a context. Second, the SDT framework provides a basis for critically exam-
ining arguments made with respect to the α = 0.05 convention, either that it is supported
by a Popperian view of science or that it is inappropriate when false negatives are worse
than false positives. As such, we hope that the framework we propose here can usefully
contribute to discussions of when and where the α = 0.05 convention is – and is not –
reasonable.
6 Conceptual clarification
In this section, we discuss three conceptual clarifications that flow from the SDT frame-
work proposed here. The first of these, base-rate neglect, has already featured in several
examples discussed in preceding sections. The second concerns whether only harms result-
ing from errors should be considered in setting inferential thresholds, or whether benefits
ensuing from correct inferences should also be considered. Finally, we consider the idea
that, as scientific certainty increases, the relevance of values to choice of inferential thresh-
olds diminishes. The effect of base rates is a topic that has been largely neglected in the
AIR literature. The other two issues have been discussed in philosophical literature, but
the SDT framework nevertheless provides valuable clarifications and refinements.23
6.1 Base-rate neglect
The role of base rates has not featured prominently in the AIR literature. Bayesian
prior probabilites have not featured prominently either. For instance, Douglas’ work,
23Although these sections continue to rely on the equal-variance Gaussian sampling
distributions machinery, qualitatively comparable results would be obtained with other
symmetric, equal-variance sampling distributions.
Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal, only mentions prior probabilities in a footnote
commenting upon Bayesian statistics, rather than in connection with the determination
of inferential thresholds.
...the Bayesian framework, has yet to be shown useful in real world contexts
where both likelihoods and priors are disputed. ... ...When both likelihoods
and priors are disputed, abundant evidence may still never produce a conver-
gence of probability. (Douglas, 2009, p. 183, fn 15)
It is clear that base rates feature in the Optimal Operating Point Condition (3.4). It is also
clear that in many types of real-world inferential problems – such as in diagnosing a disease,
or in detecting faulty products on a manufacturing line – base rates are indeed expressible
as ratios of frequencies. In the tuberculosis example we illustrated the large effect that
base rates can have on the location of the optimal inferential threshold. Increasing the
base rate from 0.0005 to 0.0087 shifted the optimal inferential threshold (α∗) by a factor of
49 from 0.0159 to 0.78. And in Section 5 we illustrated the three-way interaction between
base rates, incremental-misclassification costs, and discriminability (AUC). Hence it is
not possible to discuss difficulties related to a rigid application of the α = 0.05 criterion
without making an assumption about the base rate.
SDT shows that both base-rate odds and discriminability (i.e. AUC) are moderators
of the effect of changes in misclassification costs upon the optimal inferential threshold.
Nevertheless base-rate odds are a much more powerful ‘lever’ with which to influence the
optimal inferential threshold than misclassification costs. This finding has been noted
and replicated in empirical studies (Wolfe et al., 2005, 2007; Evans et al., 2013). But
the analytical structure of SDT also reveals why this is the case. On a basic level it is
partly due to the fact that any change in the base rate has two separate impacts upon
the prior odds term,24 whereas there is no comparable ‘double impact’ of changes in
24Any small increase in pD entails a corresponding decrease in p¬D = 1−pD. Hence the
ratio p¬D/pD decreases not only because the denominator pD increases, but also because
misclassification costs on the incremental misclassification-cost ratio. On a deeper level,
the SDT model reveals that the inferential threshold in the underlying score variable x∗
is highly sensitive to – indeed completely dominated by – small base rates, when they are
present. If either base rate becomes very small, the inferential threshold moves far into
the sampling distribution’s tail, accommodating the improbable state.25 For equal-unit-
variance Gaussian sampling distributions with µ¬D = 0, the optimal cutoff threshold in










Notice that as p¬D → 0, log(p¬D) → −∞, and thus x
∗ → −∞. Alternatively if pD → 0,
then − log(pD)→∞, and thus x
∗ →∞.
The necessity of incorporating base rates into the analysis of inferential thresholds is
among the key implications of our formal modelling approach. This is not to suggest that
existing analyses are rendered logically invalid. Abstracting from other factors, increasing
the cost of Type-I errors continues to suggest a more conservative inferential threshold,
while increasing the cost of Type-II errors continues to suggest a more liberal inferential
threshold. However, the base rate is an exceptionally strong modifier of the effect of error
costs on the inferential threshold. The effect of any finite change in error costs becomes
arbitrarily small if either base rate (p¬D or pD) is sufficiently small. This means that
under certain base-rate configurations, the impact of changes in error costs is rendered
inconsequential.
In addition, variation in base rates among subpopulations is often extremely important
for reverse engineering value judgments that are implicit in a choice of inferential thresh-
old. The prevalence of tuberculosis, for instance, is higher in identifiable sub-populations.
Fournet et al. (2006) report that in 2003 the incidence of tuberculosis within Rio de
of the corresponding decrease in the numerator p¬D.
25Below it is shown that when p¬D → 0, x
∗ → −∞, while when pD → 0, x
∗ →∞.
Janeiro state prisons was 15 times higher than in the general state population. A more
recent study estimates the incidence rate among prisoners to be more than 20 times that
in the general Brazilian population (Carbone et al., 2015). In the U.S. prison population,
the prevalence of tuberculosis can be up to 17 times that in the general U.S. popula-
tion (Roberts et al., 2006). And in the low-incidence country of the Netherlands, 61%
of registered tuberculosis patients were born abroad, even though the foreign-born pop-
ulation comprises only 11% of the overall population (Kik et al., 2009). In each of these
cases, use of the general-population inferential threshold for the purpose of testing the
sub-population can be interpreted as placing a lower value on the lives of members of the
high-base-rate sub-population.
6.2 Further remarks
The SDT framework suggests solutions for an array of issues, including some that are cur-
rently being debated within philosophy. Here we briefly note two of these ongoing debates
along with the reframing suggested by SDT, deferring full and formal treatment to future
work.
Harms alone vs. harms and benefits: Among philosophers who accept the general premise
that scientists have a moral obligation to consider the potential non-epistemic conse-
quences of mistakenly accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, consensus is yet to crystallize
over whether only harms alone should influence the inferential threshold, or whether the
associated benefits should also be taken into account (Douglas, 2009; Elliott, 2011; Wilholt,
2016). For Douglas (2009) the very reason why scientists should incorporate non-epistemic
values into their reasoning about inferential thresholds is that scientists bear a moral re-
sponsibility for the unintended harms flowing from their actions due to recklessness or
negligence (68–71). Hence it is the potential harms flowing from errors in scientific infer-
ence that scientists are morally required to incorporate into the determination of inferential
thresholds. Some philosophers have asked whether “the potential benefits of accepting or
rejecting claims erroneously” should also be considered, or indeed whether also the bene-
fits and harms of correctly accepting or rejecting claims should also be considered (Elliott,
2011, 15). Torsten Wilholt (2016) argues that responsible epistemic risk management
cannot exclude the non-epistemic consequences (benefits and harms) of correct classifica-
tion, and that imposing an asymmetry between the consequences of erroneous and correct
classification cannot be justified.
SDT’s expected-misclassification-cost loss function places harms and benefits on an
equal footing. It also places the consequences ensuing from misclassification on an equal
footing with the consequences ensuing from correct classification. SDT does this not for
ethical reasons, but for mathematical reasons and for reasons inherent in the expected-
misclassification-cost loss function. Benefits are equivalent to negative costs, i.e. a benefit
is created by reducing cost. Costs are equivalent to negative benefits, i.e. a cost is
incurred when benefits are reduced. This relationship underpins the practice in the medical
SDT literature of referring to the ‘cost-benefit ratio’ as derived above in equation (3.5).
Furthermore, there is also a fundamental sense in which cost calculus inherently requires
both costs and benefits to be fully accounted for, in that the concept of ‘opportunity cost’
is defined as ‘foregone benefit’. Without accounting for benefits, it is not possible to define
opportunity costs.
Thus, in examples involving diagnosis, the harm of a false negative often depends on
an opportunity for effective treatment being missed. That is why it is sensible for the
denominator in (3.4), the Optimal Operating Point Condition, to include the difference
between CFN and CTP rather than CFN alone. When effective treatment exists and is
accessible, CTP is less than CFN, and hence harm is done by a missed diagnosis. The
relevance of both CFP and CTN for assessing the harms of false positives is somewhat less
apparent, given the tendency to treat true negatives as the default state. However, CTN
can also be viewed as conferring benefits, whose presence are relevant to extent to which
CFP exceeds CTN. For example, if the patient is deeply anxious prior to the test due
to believing that the disease is present, then a true negative result confers a substantial
emotional benefit. In such a case, a false positive is harmful in part because it entails
forgoing the benefit of correcting an anxiety-inducing false belief.
Do values become ‘less important’ as uncertainty decreases?: The answer turns on what
are meant respectively by ‘decrease in uncertainty’ and ‘become less important’. Within
the SDT framework it is natural to operationalize decreases in uncertainty as increases in
the resolving power of the scientific experiment – i.e. as increases in d′ and AUC. But as
we show below, decreases in such scientific uncertainty cause non-monotonic changes in
either α∗ or 1−β∗. In other words, values continue to drive non-obvious changes in α∗ and
1−β∗ as scientific uncertainty decreases. The sense in which values become ‘less important’
is more subtle, and is induced not by the mere change in d′ and AUC magnitude, but by
the associated increase in the curvature of the ROC curve as d′ and AUC increase. For








, the relative response in (β∗/α∗) becomes
smaller as scientific uncertainty decreases. The sensitivity of (β∗/α∗) to changes in values
is attenuated as uncertainty decreases.
Consider these two points in turn. The ability of the experiment to distinguish between
H0 : ¬D and H1 : D is summarized by d
′ = (µD − µ¬D)/σ. The larger d
′, the larger the
AUC, and if the FPR = α is held constant, then the remaining uncertainy associated with
the inference – i.e. FNR = β – is necessarily smaller. However the premise within the AIR
literature is that fixed inferential thresholds such as α = 0.05 are inappropriate insofar
as they do not reflect error-cost considerations, nor, as we have shown, do they reflect
base-rate considerations. Taking these considerations seriously, we see that the inferential
threshold changes as d′ and the AUC increase. Figure 7 shows the paths traced out by
the optimal operating points within the ROC space as AUC varies within the interval
(0.5,1), for several iso-expected-cost-line slopes. These constant-slope loci are known as
isoclines. Figure 7 exhibits isoclines for five different iso-expected-cost-line slopes, two









case is straightforward and conforms with lay intution, in that both α∗ and β∗ decrease
Figure 7: Isoclines traced as AUC varies within the interval (0.5,1), for different fixed























    









relationship is non-monotonic for either α∗ or β∗.
Thus as the resolving power of science improves, we cannot in general infer a monotonic
reduction in inferential-error probabilities when scientists are appropriately incorporating
non-epistemic consequences into their inferential thresholds. As the AUC increases from
very low levels, the likelihood of a Type-I error increases if the expected incremental
cost of misclassifying a negative exceeds the expected incremental cost of misclassifying
a positive. Conversely, if the expected incremental cost of a false positive exceed that of
false a negative, then the likelihood of a Type-II error rises as AUC increases from very
low levels. Value considerations – in the form of the slope of the iso-expected-cost line –
determine the critical level of AUC above which further increases in the AUC reduce the
likelihood of erroneous results (i.e. both Type-I and Type-II errors). But even above the
critical AUC level, value considerations continue to determine the location of the optimal
inferential threshold x∗, and thereby both α∗ and β∗ as well.
Turning to the second point, the importance of value considerations may be quanti-







slope. This is a measure of the sensitivity of the (β∗/α∗) ratio to changes
in the iso-expected-cost-line (i.e. values) slope. Here we formalize relative changes as per-
centage changes, which permit meaningful comparisons e.g. between different AUC levels.
Consider two AUC levels AUC′,AUC′′ ∈ [0.5, 1] such that AUC′′ > AUC′. The larger the









the percentage increase in (β∗/α∗) is smaller when the resolving power
























































power of science (i.e. AUC) increaseses.
7 Conclusions
We have aimed to show that SDT provides a tractable formal structure with which to
address questions about where inferential thresholds should be placed, ’reverse engineer-
ing’ values from choices of inferential thresholds, and for clarifying conceptual questions
regarding inductive risk.
Within SDT, optimal inferential thresholds necessarily reflect base-rate information.
Yet base rates have received little attention within the AIR literature. Thus, the fact that
base rates powerfully modify how much error costs matter for optimal inferential thresholds
suggests that this nexus should in future be addressed within the AIR literature. A near-
zero base rate in particular exerts an overwhelming, dominant influence on the location of
the optimal inferential threshold.
Furthermore, SDT’s formal structure carries implications for a number of ongoing
debates concerning inductive risk. In some cases SDT suggests a particular reframing,
while in others SDT suggests a particular resolution. As an example of the latter, the SDT-
based approach suggests that benefits accruing in each State×Inference category need to be
accounted for. The consequences of not doing so would include an inability to incorporate
opportunity costs, because these are defined as foregone benefits. As an example of the
former, the SDT-based approach suggests a way in which we can understand and quantify
the notion that values become ‘less important’ as scientific uncertainty decreases. It turns
out that erroneous-inference probabilities (α∗, β∗) generally do not decrease monotonically
with the resolving power of scientific experiments, and values continue to influence (α∗, β∗)
throughout. However, when framed in terms of sensitivity, indeed the responsiveness of
the (β∗/α∗) ratio to changes in values does diminish as the resolving power of scientific
experiments increase.
Underpinning these conceptual insights, SDT allows one to solve for the optimal in-
ferential threshold in the underlying score variable x∗, or equivalently in Type-I (α∗) and
Type-II (β∗) error probabilities. In this standard ‘prospective’ mode, SDT provides a pre-
cise answer to the question of where the inferential threshold should be placed, along with
an equally precise answer as to why. It is also straightforward to implement counterfactual
analyses, for instance to determine how much the ineferential threshold would shift if the
resolving power of experiments (d′) improved by a specified amount, such as e.g. 10%
or 20%. Equally, it is straightforward to determine the amount by which a particular
parameter, or collection of parameters, would have to change in order for the Type-I (or
alternatively the Type-II) error probability to fall to a specified target level.
SDT may also be employed retrospectively to ‘reverse engineer’ the values that ra-
tionalize the use of a particular inferential threshold in a specific context. Whereas
the inductive-risk literature has discussed the α = 0.05 inferential-threshold convention
used in many scientific disciplines, with SDT one may reverse engineer the incremental-
misclassification-cost ratio required to rationalize the α = 0.05 threshold given the base
rate and the experiment’s discriminability d′. Since both the base rate and discriminabil-
ity vary greatly from one hypothesis to another, both within a scientific field as well
as across scientific fields, rigid application of the α = 0.05 inferential threshold entails
that most hypotheses are tested using an inferential threshold that is, to a greater or
lesser extent, biased. By employing SDT in reverse-engineering mode, this bias may be
quantified, mapped, and studied. Moreover, in settings where inferential procedures are
performed on members of the public, SDT in reverse-engineering mode can reveal whose
interests are being superseded and whose interests are being accommodated. For instance,
does a medical diagnostic threshold reflect the misclassification costs of the patient, the
medical practitioner, the clinic or hospital, the health-insurance company, or the national
healthcare system? Armed with this information and the SDT formal framework, moral
philosophy can address the question of whose interests and misclassification costs should
be used in setting diagnostic inferential thresholds.
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